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DEFENDING AMERICA

Major George Fielding Eliot



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DEFENDING AMERICA

BY

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Introduction

This survey undertakes to appraise the military and strategical position of the United States in the post-Munich world. It is essentially a military analysis by a military writer. It does not attempt to say what kind of foreign policy this country should adopt, but points out the inevitable relation between our foreign and defense policies, as well as some of the military implications of the alternative courses which are being debated today.

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1. FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICIES

Any survey of our national defense must needs begin with the question of what it is we seek to defend. Obviously, we maintain armed forces to defend our territory from attack. But we are also concerned about the defense of our outlying possessions, and the support of certain policies and interests which we regard as vital to the life of the nation. In the post-Munich world what policies and interests are sufficiently vital to be defended by force? This is a matter which the people of the United States must ultimately decide. Under our system of government, the formulation of policy rests with the President and the Congress. The army and navy do not make policy, but they may be called upon to enforce it in a given situation. Hence, in projecting foreign policies, the civil branch of the government must take into account the willingness of the people to support particular policies and interests, and the ability of the army and navy to defend them. The military and naval branches, on the other hand, must know what is expected of them.

The American people would unquestionably be prepared to defend the actual territory of the continental United States from attack. But outside of these limits, we have certain possessions—the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico—which may also need protection. Our flag still flies in the Philippine Islands, whose protection will prove difficult because of the factor of distance. The strategical conditions affecting these various possessions will be more carefully examined later. But beyond the protection of our own territory, we have certain other interests in which foreign and military policy are jointly concerned.

The policies and interests of this country which might involve us in differences with foreign powers, raising the question of what we are prepared to defend by force, may be discussed under the following four heads:

THE MONROE DOCTRINE. First promulgated in 1823 with British support, this Doctrine excludes the entire Western Hemisphere from the areas open to non-American colonization and conquest. The

Doctrine is being re-emphasized today, as nations hungry for raw materials extend their integrated political, economic and military systems in various parts of the world. Our security depends on preventing the establishment anywhere in this hemisphere of bases of operations by countries bent on expansion. We have consequently reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine and, since Britain is now faced with what may be a long and desperate struggle for existence, the force necessary to support that Doctrine must be at our own disposal, with such aid in particular instances as might be afforded by one or more of the Latin American countries. There are many indications that the maintenance, by force if necessary, of the Monroe Doctrine commands the support of the great majority of our people.

THE OPEN DOOR. The principle of equal rights and commercial opportunities in China, asserted by John Hay as Secretary of State, has been challenged and is now in serious danger of being completely wiped out by the action of Japan. During the past forty years we have failed to make it clear whether we are prepared to maintain the principle of the Open Door by armed force. If we are, we shall need a considerably larger naval and military establishment than we possess at the present time. If not, we may see our interests in that part of the world greatly impaired. It should be noted, however, that American-Japanese trade is important to both countries.

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, SHIPPING, INVESTMENTS AND PROPERTY ABROAD. This is a highly complicated and controversial question. One school of thought insists that attempts to give such protection involved us in the World War. During the Spanish civil war, however, such protection was given to our citizens without serious risk. In China the United States—like France and Britain—is using its navy and marines to protect American lives and interests. Clashes with the Japanese authorities, and serious incidents like the sinking of the gunboat *Panay*, have occurred. American property rights in Mexico have frequently involved us in difficulties with the government of that country. There can be no hard and fast rule as to situations so various and complicated. In the past, each case has been dealt with on its merits. Throughout the history of this republic our navy has been engaged in giving protection to Americans

and their property abroad, both in times of political unrest and in great disasters such as floods, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions. Force has on occasion been employed for this purpose. But use of force in such cases is the normal practice of maritime nations and usually not a cause of war. Even pacific nations like Holland and Norway now maintain naval patrols in the Strait of Gibraltar to protect their shipping from interference by Spanish warships.

“COLLECTIVE” OR UNILATERAL ACTION TO STOP AGGRESSION. While the United States did not join the League of Nations, a section of American opinion has advocated a policy of “collective action” against aggressor states. At the same time Congress, in the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937, consistently declined to give the President discretionary authority to impose economic or financial embargoes against aggressors for fear that the United States might thus become involved in European or Asiatic wars. This does not, however, rule out cooperation with Britain and France to check Japanese aggression in the Far East, where American interests are directly affected. Nor can one assert that the people of the United States would never be willing to take unilateral action against Japan in the form of trade reprisals, embargoes, and similar measures which, being acts of force, might lead to other acts of force and eventually to war. The Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937, intended to prevent the United States from becoming embroiled in foreign quarrels, were not applied to the Sino-Japanese conflict on the ground that no legal state of war existed. Yet the 1937 Act was applied to the Spanish civil war, resulting in an embargo on arms to Spain which, in practice, injured the Spanish government more than the Rebels—who were obtaining war supplies from Germany and Italy.

An increasing demand is being made in some quarters for American cooperation with the European democracies to stop Nazi and fascist aggression. The crisis period preceding the Munich accord caused grave concern in this country. Many people seemed to believe that, if war occurred, we would inevitably be drawn into it. While this assumption may not prove correct, the danger of our becoming involved in a European conflict cannot be overlooked.

II. AMERICA IN THE POST-MUNICH WORLD

The principal factors affecting the military position of the United States in the post-Munich world may be summarized as follows:

1. The changing balance of power on the continent of Europe, where Germany is becoming dominant.
2. The restrictions on British freedom of action, and British sea power, resulting from this and other factors.
3. The altered situation in Latin America, due to these developments, to the spread of Nazi and fascist propaganda and commercial penetration, and to revival of the military implications of the Monroe Doctrine.
4. Japan's attempt to establish its hegemony in the Far East by force of arms.

(1) Germany, having absorbed Austria and reduced Czechoslovakia to the position of satellite, with consequent injury to the strategic position and prestige of France and Britain in Eastern Europe, has become the dominant power on the European continent. It has obtained direct, although not unimpeded, access to new sources of foodstuffs and raw materials in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania, and menaces the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. Nor can it be assumed that German ambitions will be confined to Europe. Already Hitler demands colonies, and is expanding the German navy, particularly submarines, for which these colonies would provide overseas bases.

(2) British sea power is menaced by German air power, which can strike at its great dockyards, while Italian air power menaces Britain's Mediterranean bases at Gibraltar and Malta, and Aden lies under threat of Italian air attack from Ethiopia. Britain's freedom of action is circumscribed by the threat of German air power against London and other centers of the British Isles, whose vulnerability to air attack is a matter of geographical position not wholly to be eliminated by British rearmament. In the Far East, British interests are menaced by Japan, and Britain is at present unable to dispatch to that area forces sufficient to meet this threat.

Thus, the tacit arrangement by which Britain policed the Atlantic while American naval strength was concentrated in the Pacific, is at

an end, at least for the present; and the Monroe Doctrine is supported, not by both fleets, but by ours alone. Moreover, the historical check which British sea power has imposed on the rise of any dominant power on the continent is gravely limited by the military ascendancy of Germany.

The intervention of Germany and Italy in the Spanish civil war presents another threat both to British and French communications with their colonial empires. It also menaces the United States because Franco Spain may become a mouthpiece for fascist propaganda in Latin America; and German or German-Italian control of Spanish and Portuguese islands (the Azores, Canaries and Cape Verdes) would afford approaches to the American continent.

The decline of British power, moreover, causes uneasiness in the Dominions, some of which—Canada and to a lesser degree Australia—are showing a tendency toward reliance on our navy as their ultimate protection. While it is certainly too early to predict the break-up of the British Empire, it is full time to consider the possibilities of a situation in which certain of the Dominions may find that their security depends not on British, but on American sea power.

Certain British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, other than Canada, are of strategic interest to the United States. Notable among these are Newfoundland, which guards the northeastern approaches to this country from Europe and, conversely, might become the last stepping-stone for air attack proceeding via the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland; Bermuda, which lies but 680 miles from New York and would be a dangerous air base in hostile hands, but a most advantageous naval outpost for cruiser, submarine and flying-boat operations if controlled by the United States; the Bahama Islands, lying close to Florida, which not only command two of our most important waterways—the Strait of Florida and the Windward Passage—but afford numerous lurking places for hostile submarines and seaplanes; and the British West Indies, one of which, Jamaica, occupies a central position in the Caribbean Sea, while others (Barbados and Trinidad) command the approaches to the Panama Canal from the east coast of South America, and would, if we had bases there, carry our naval power 500 miles closer to Brazilian and Argentine ports

than at present. Considering the tendency of the present British government to cooperate with Germany, its passivity at Munich, its underlying military weakness due to the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attack, and its failure to settle Britain's war debts to the United States (which might be offset by our acquisition of British possessions in the Caribbean), it is perhaps not too much to say that our increased responsibilities for the defense of the Western Hemisphere require complete re-examination of the whole question of naval and air bases in the New World. This is particularly urgent because of the German-Danish controversy over North Schleswig which, if Denmark succumbs to German pressure, might bring the Faroes-Iceland-Greenland line of operations into German hands; and the possibility that Germany might recover its former African colonies, or acquire control, with Italy, of the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic islands.

(3) Our relations with Latin America remain a focal point of concern. The Lima conference accomplished far more than appeared in the press, and the Declaration of Lima indicated a much greater degree of continental solidarity in the face of external menace than might have been supposed from early reports. Mistrust of our intentions, however, has not been wholly eliminated, and is in part being kept alive by very active German, Italian and Japanese propaganda. Extremely careful diplomacy is needed in dealing with this situation, which is complicated by such developments as Mexico's expropriation of American and British properties. The fundamental fact remains that, with or without Latin American cooperation, we cannot for our own safety permit the establishment anywhere in this hemisphere of bases of operations for the naval, air and land forces of expansionist powers like Germany or Japan.

(4) In the Far East, Japan is proceeding methodically with the conquest of China—a conquest which, if successfully completed, will, in the words of one of Japan's Chinese puppet-statesmen, combine the resources of one-third of the world's population under a single leadership. This development would certainly have far-reaching economic, political and military effects. Many people believe that we should intervene to prevent it by force while there is yet time. It has been proposed that Britain, France, the United States, and possibly The Netherlands, all profoundly interested in any change of

the Far Eastern *status quo*, should jointly intervene in behalf of China. Some of the methods suggested, apart from the actual use of military force, are the grant of credits to China, an embargo on exports to Japan, and financial and commercial "reprisals" against Tokyo. These measures, however, are liable to be regarded by Japanese opinion as acts of force, to be countered by acts of force perhaps far more drastic in nature. The Western powers, in addition to their commercial interests in China, have territorial possessions in the Far East which would be endangered if Japan became actively hostile. None of them, including ourselves, now maintains in the Far East naval forces adequate to protect these possessions against the Japanese navy. None of them, except ourselves, has such a naval force anywhere in the Pacific area. The danger is that we may be drawn into "cooperative" measures which would result in hostile action by Japan, which we shall then be left alone to deal with. Britain's commercial stake in China is far greater than ours; but Britain has as yet taken no action—such as the dispatch of capital ships to its great naval base at Singapore—which would indicate any real intention of supporting its opposition to the Japanese advance in China by the naval force necessary to make its opposition effective.

Meanwhile we have to consider the position of the Philippines, complicated on the one hand by the difficulty of defending them against Japanese attack, and on the other by a possibly violent reaction by the American people against their abandonment in such event—even though the islands may already have achieved that independent status which present law will give them in 1946.

One further factor which must be considered is the possible outbreak of a major war: whether in Western Europe, between Britain and France on the one side, Germany and Italy on the other; in Eastern Europe, between Germany and Russia; in the Far East, between Russia and Japan; or possibly a combination of all three. But the course of such events is so impossible to predict, and the exigencies arising from them so difficult to foresee, that only confusion of thought can result from pursuing gloomy speculations too far.

This brief and incomplete picture of a troubled world, and of America's position in it, may serve as an introduction to a study of American military policy.

III. THE STRATEGY OF INSULAR STATES

Strategy, in the national sense, is largely a matter of geography. It is necessary for each nation to have its own strategy, based, of course, on the sound principles which have conditioned the conduct of war throughout the ages, and have been proved valid by centuries of experience. The instruments of warfare, like the instruments of other arts, may change, but the principles which affect the use of those instruments do not change any more than the principles of painting were changed by the invention of the airbrush. The art of war consists in the understanding of its principles, and their application to the enormously variable situations which confront a commander in the field.

The principles of war have been variously listed. For purposes of simplification, three may be stated as fundamental:

CONCENTRATION, best epitomized by Forrest's axiom: "Git thar fustest with the mostest men."

OFFENSIVE ACTION, always necessary to a decision. Decisive results are not to be obtained by sitting still and awaiting attack at your enemy's chosen time and place. This principle is especially important to a naval policy, for a navy—like an air force—is inherently an offensive instrument. The underlying purpose may be defense; when it comes to fighting, the best defense is to make your enemy desire to let you alone by directly threatening his own vital interests.

SECURITY, that is, the protection of your vital interests or positions while you are conducting offensive operations elsewhere. Offensive warfare must always proceed from a defensive base.

With these principles in mind, any brief examination of American strategy must next consider their application to the particular situations which may arise in the attack or defense of an insular state such as ours; for the United States, in the military sense, is an island. We have no powerful neighbors which can march across our frontiers with great armies, or threaten us with huge air forces. We are, in fact, the only considerable military power in the Western Hemisphere; our potential enemies are all outside that hemisphere. This means that our safety lies in maintaining command of the seas to

the east, west and south of us; for any danger to us must come initially by sea.

An insular state may be attacked in two ways: by assault, that is by a direct attempt at invasion by an enemy army, accompanied and assisted by air forces; or by investment, that is, by blockade—usually a task for a navy, but in which both army and air force may assist. Assault strikes at the internal communications of the state, the means of production and distribution, and the seat of political power. Investment strikes at the external communications of the state, and seeks to reduce it to surrender by cutting it off from external sources of supply.

Vulnerability to assault is, for an insular state, conditioned by the existence of bases for the attacking force within reach of some vital part of the country, and by the degree of naval force which it possesses commanding the approaches to such vital parts. Assault is much more easily dealt with by preventing the attacker from getting within striking distance at all, than by repelling him after he has arrived.

Vulnerability to investment is conditioned, first, by a country's degree of dependence on supplies from outside. In this respect the United States is better off than any other large power, but it is not wholly self-sufficient. We lack rubber, silk, manganese, coffee, tin, tungsten and chromite. Substitutes are being developed for rubber, but there is no more favorable field—from the strategic point of view—for American investment than in the rebuilding of the South American rubber industry, once the world's chief source of supply, thus making us independent of distant plantations in the East Indies and Malaya. Silk, mainly imported from Japan, is still an essential for parachutes and cartridge cases. Coffee is fortunately a Western Hemisphere product. Manganese is produced in quantity in the state of Minas Geraes, Brazil. Improvement of navigation on the São Francisco River, and extension southward of the Ceara Railway for some 40 kilometers to the foot of navigation on that river, would provide this mineral with an outlet to the sea much more conveniently and safely reached from our ports than the present rail outlets at Rio and Victoria. Development of the Cuban manganese deposits would also be useful. Tin can be obtained in Bolivia; here the need

is for capital investment and for the development of our tin-smelting industry. For tungsten, chromite, and some other items, the best resource is the creation of strategic reserves in time of peace. By adopting these measures, the United States may make itself relatively invulnerable to blockade, as long as we are able to keep open our lines of communication with Latin America.

Close blockade of our coasts, in any case, we need not fear as long as we possess a sufficient navy. Distant blockade, that is, the stopping of our trade at focal points beyond the comfortable reach of our naval forces—such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the mouth of the English Channel, the Torres Strait, the Strait of San Bernardino, and the approaches to the China coast—might prove seriously annoying unless we took steps to reduce our dependence on supplies which must come by such routes.

Direct attack by air, as contributing either to assault or investment, must also be considered. Here the oceans to east and west of the United States serve as important barriers. It is not yet possible for airplanes carrying military loads to fly across the Atlantic Ocean, much less the Pacific. Planes which have made trans-oceanic flights have had to be fully loaded with fuel. Even were it possible to carry a few bombs, the results would not be commensurate with the degree of force expended. And even if an advance in aeronautical science renders it possible within a few years to carry heavier bombloads in trans-Atlantic hops, it will still be beyond the realm of possibility to control and coordinate the operation of air forces flying great distances overseas in such a way as to produce that continuity of massed effort which is essential to any real success from distant bombing operations. This optimistic view of the matter, however, is entirely conditioned on the nature and quality of the resistance to be encountered by a potential enemy.

If it were possible for a European power with a great air force to obtain possession of a base on this side of the ocean, within easy bombing distance of important American centers of industry or population, the situation would be drastically altered. To obtain such a base, of course, it would be necessary to send ships and troops to fight for it; hence our safety from air attack is directly proportionate to our ability to deal effectively with such an attempt. This

is first of all a matter for our navy to deal with; but there must also be considered the possibility of a sudden attack in the Atlantic while our fleet is in the Pacific, or perhaps in South American waters.

It is for repelling such an attempt that we need a strong army air force, with a high proportion of long-range planes, and backed up by navy patrol-squadrons capable, with their big flying boats, of operating considerable distances to seaward. Submarines will also be useful in attacking enemy ships engaged in landing troops or supplies at any point within their radius of action. A strong anti-aircraft defense is necessary for dealing with raids on vital centers. Our principal naval and commercial ports must be defended by heavy guns and mines against the possibility of bombardment or seizure as an enemy base. Finally, a force of well-trained and completely equipped mobile troops will contribute that element of unifying strength necessary to bind the defensive measures into a coordinated whole, and beat off any form of attack which may be directed against our coasts until our fleet can reach the theater of action and operate effectively against the sea communications of the assailant—on which the whole fabric of his plan must necessarily rest.

In the end, therefore, the outcome of the struggle rests on the ability of our fleet to command the sea communications by which, and by which alone, danger may come to us or to any of our neighbors in Latin America. Indeed, the object of all naval operations is to control sea communications, to preserve them for one's own use, whether military or commercial, and to deny them to an enemy. When, within any defined maritime area, there is either a fleet capable of exercising such control, or an immediate possibility of the appearance of such a fleet within that area, it will not be practicable to undertake the overseas transport of large numbers of troops or air matériel until that fleet has been disposed of, and control of the seas transferred into the hands of the opposing fleet. Only recognition of this axiom of amphibious warfare can guard the United States against the possibility of having to fight. That axiom must be recognized by us in order that we may maintain our navy at sufficient strength; and it must also be understood by our potential antagonists who, in weighing risk against advantage, must find the balance heavily weighted on the side of risk.

A word may be said here about the use of air power as a defensive instrument. Total dependence on the use of airplanes by an insular power limits the range of defense to a short distance offshore: say 600 miles. Outside those limits the enemy has complete freedom of action. He may establish himself in such positions of vantage as he sees fit. He may make full and careful preparations for the delivery of his attack at his chosen time and place. He is in full possession of the initiative. He may cut off all routes of sea communications not protected by shore-based aircraft. Possessing the remarkable mobility given by the free use of the sea, he may make full use of feints against one point, producing a concentration of the defending force there, and then strike with his own main concentration at another place. He may make a series of raids on coastal cities—using airplanes flying from carriers, which may leave the carriers at one point and rejoin them at a preconcerted rendezvous—and thus terrorize an entire coast line. Even the addition of submarines to the defending forces will not help very much, since submarines are not fast enough to catch up with carriers or their escorting cruisers, and can only hope to injure them if chance brings an opportunity their way. But the chief danger is the enemy's freedom to establish himself at near-by points, out of reach of air attack, where he may assemble sources for a future step to a nearer base, and strike at his own time. Finally, one must take into consideration the sensitivity of the airplane to adverse weather conditions, and its limitations as to carrying power and time of flight, which in turn limit its continuity of effort. Full dependence on the airplane by the United States would require the maintenance of an enormous air fleet, and behind that a gigantic airplane industry; for, lacking a navy, we should have to face the possibility of the transport to this hemisphere and the eventual concentrated employment against us of the entire air force of a European power or group of powers.

A correct appreciation of the strategy of an insular state may be gained by an examination of British history. Great Britain for more than two centuries maintained an expanding empire—which eventually covered the entire globe, with possessions on every continent and in every sea—without building up a huge conscript army like those which burdened the nations of the European continent. This

world-girdling empire was entirely dependent on the British navy, which guarded the routes of sea communications linking up far-flung possessions, conveying to the British Isles food and raw materials, and transporting to the colonies and other markets the manufactured goods produced by British industry. The British army, during this period, was a small, highly trained professional force, adequate to protect the British Isles against raids, to act as imperial police, and to provide expeditionary forces for campaigns of limited objective such as the Peninsular and Crimean wars, being conveyed and provisioned by the navy. The Empire had but one land frontier which was potentially insecure—the northwest frontier of India—and here special measures were taken by the maintenance of the Indian Army.

Today, the British navy is no longer the secure shield of the Empire, owing to the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attack from the continent. This attack cannot be warded off by the navy, because the British Isles are too close to the source from which air danger comes. Moreover, the Empire's line of communications to the Far East, especially India, is threatened by Italy's air power in the Mediterranean; and even the alternative route around the Cape is now menaced by the establishment of fascist power in Spain.

The United States, however, being secure from direct attack of this sort, can still pursue in matters of defense a naval policy similar to that which preserved the British people for so many years, and assured them almost a century of peace (1815-1914), broken only by colonial wars and the comparatively insignificant expedition to the Crimea.

IV. OUR STRATEGICAL POSITION

In the Atlantic, our chief concern must always be the defense of the northeastern section of our country—New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, the District of Columbia and Ohio—where are concentrated the centers of our heavy industry, our financial power and our political institutions, and where one-third of our population lives.

We are almost 3,000 miles from the bases of any trans-Atlantic

power, and our chief reliance is our naval command of the intervening seas. The possibility of air attack by way of Iceland, Greenland and Labrador or Newfoundland, however, must not be overlooked. This can be immediately dealt with by the establishment of air bases in New England—lacking at present—and still better by obtaining rights for such bases in Newfoundland, which would, moreover, give us a much greater degree of control of the North Atlantic shipping lanes. We have four major naval bases on the Atlantic coast—Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk. The facilities of these bases are adequate for the support of the fleet if operating in this area.

To the southward, the Caribbean Sea, antechamber to the Panama Canal, is the most important link in our chain of sea defenses. It is the strategic key to the oceans which wash our two maritime frontiers, the Atlantic and Pacific, because it commands the short line of communications between them. Our chief base in the Caribbean is Guantanamo Bay, which we hold on lease from the Cuban Republic. We have also an eastern outpost in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, lying about 1,000 miles seaward from the tip of Florida. Neither of these points is fortified, but improvement and strengthening of these bases are now being considered. Operations in the South Atlantic, in defense of a Latin-American republic, would necessarily require us to have the use of Brazilian bases, and would be much facilitated by the possession of a base in the vicinity of Trinidad or Barbados.

Panama itself is heavily defended, and its defenses are to be increased. The importance of this position cannot be overestimated; indeed it is not too much to say that, possessing as we do for our own use the only short line of communications between our two far-distant maritime frontiers, together with the ability to deny its use to an enemy, we are by that happy circumstance relieved of the necessity of building two navies, one for each ocean. No military position, however, is impregnable. There are too many instances in history of what may be accomplished by disciplined and determined men for us to indulge in complacency on that score. A strong argument, therefore, exists for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal—surveys for which have been completed—in order to secure a sec-

ond means of interoceanic transit for the fleet. This would be cheaper than building two navies, and would, moreover, have certain commercial advantages: first, in shortening the sea-distance between East and West Coast ports by about 700 miles; second, in giving us a canal in which American intercoastal traffic may be relieved from paying tolls without violating treaty obligations. The problem of defending two canals would be greater than, but not double, that of defending one.

Our chief potential enemy in the Atlantic has been pictured as Germany, or perhaps a combination of Germany and Italy. Both these countries are rapidly building up their fleets, including types of vessels suitable for oceanic operations. Both are busily engaged in anti-American propaganda in Latin America. Germany, at least, has definite colonial ambitions on the west coast of Africa. By their operations in Spain, they are threatening to increase their influence in Latin America, while at the same time acquiring possession or control of such strategic positions as the Azores, Canary and Cape Verde Islands. Both, finally, are definitely expansionist states, extending their power by force and the threat of force; and both have political systems hostile to democracy and the rights of the individual, on which our civilization is founded.

At the moment, however, these countries do not possess fleets sufficient to support an aggressive policy in the Western Hemisphere, either singly or in combination. By 1942 the combined German-Italian fleet will be much more formidable; and although it will depend on separate sets of bases, one in the North Sea, the other in the Mediterranean, a fascist Spain may provide it with a point of concentration as well as an outlook on the Atlantic. A German-American war in the Atlantic would doubtless have its origin in some German move against a Latin American nation: either a direct attack, or armed support of some local uprising. Our fleet, based in the Caribbean, commands the communications of any such move from Europe through the "bottle-neck" between Africa and Brazil; but the distances here are considerable, and if the Germans had bases in the Cape Verdes, Portuguese Guinea, or some other favorable location on the west coast of Africa, the factor of distance might be in Germany's favor. It would therefore seem wise fore-

thought for the United States to oppose the acquisition by Germany of such positions.

The possibility of a clash between ourselves and Great Britain, now possessing the largest navy in the Atlantic, appears rather remote. Although British capital-ship strength seems likely to be greater than ours in 1942, the excess is rather obviously intended to permit the establishment of a Far Eastern squadron—else why the battleship docks at Singapore? Despite the pro-German bias of certain elements not without influence in the British government, the attitude of the Dominions seems to preclude the necessity of considering the British fleet as a potential enemy for the United States.

In the Pacific, the only other strong naval power besides ourselves is Japan. An American-Japanese war, so long discussed in some quarters in this country as well as in Japan as "inevitable," is not likely to arise from any menace by Japan to our home territories. It is much more likely to have its origin, if it takes place at all, in something Japan does in the Far East, some attack on American interests in China or perhaps on the Philippines. Japan could probably take the Philippines, as well as our isolated island of Guam, without undue effort or loss. But having done this, and wiped out our small naval and marine forces in China, there is little further that Japan could do to injure us beyond such pin-pricks as raids on our commerce or hit-and-run air attacks stealthily launched from single carriers against our coastal cities. Granting always a preponderance of naval power for the United States, the sending of a great joint expedition such as would be necessary for an attack on Hawaii (where the island of Oahu is the most formidable maritime fortress in the world) would be wholly out of the question, much less any attempt to invade our Pacific Coast states.

In weighing risk against advantage, however, Japanese leaders will be more concerned with what we can do to injure Japan if we are compelled to take up arms against it. We are accustomed to think of Japan as an insular state like Great Britain, and this is true to a certain extent; but Japan has arbitrarily provided itself with a continental frontier on the mainland of Asia, and is now engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the conquest of China, the issue of which remains undetermined. It is not yet certain, moreover, that a fresh

enemy, the Soviet Union, will not eventually enter the lists against Japan. Just as Britain's struggle to dominate France drained its strength during the Hundred Years' War and materially retarded its advance to the rank of a world power, so the struggle for dominance in China is draining the strength of Japan. Just as the seemingly complete success of Henry V, consecrated by the Treaty of Troyes in 1420, was followed by the all but complete expulsion of the English from France within forty years, so the present Japanese successes may in the end prove illusory. Or they may not. Meanwhile, however, the Japanese islands, the base on which all these efforts depend, remain vulnerable to blockade, and increasingly dependent—as industry expands at the expense of agriculture—on foreign trade and foreign sources of supply.

If, then, we should find ourselves at war with Japan, we would, by the use of our sea power, be able to strike at its most vulnerable point. In order to use our sea power in this way, we would have to establish bases in the Western Pacific. We cannot blockade Japan from Hawaii; we would have to extend the influence of our sea power westward until we could bring such pressure to bear on the exterior communications of the Japanese islands as would prove decisive. This means the use of expeditionary forces, protected and supplied by the navy, to fight for a succession of island stepping-stones—the Marshalls, the Carolines and, finally, Guam, from which last-named point we could begin to make Japan feel the strangulation of blockade. This would be a long, costly and bloody process. It is not a course on which we should lightly enter. The ultimate result, even if a complete victory for our arms, would hardly be worth the cost; but the ultimate result to Japan—always granted our initial naval superiority—is almost certain to be completely disastrous. From the Japanese point of view, the stakes are not even. Japan stands to lose all it is playing for in East Asia. The United States only stands to lose ships and men.

From the military point of view, our best chance of avoiding so costly and terrible a war is to maintain in the Pacific such naval and military establishments as shall constitute a risk too formidable for Japan to contemplate with equanimity. We should, however, bear in mind that by increasing our establishments to excess, we

may drive Japan into a naval race which, taxing its resources to exhaustion, may in the end bring about a war born of sheer desperation. It is evident that very careful consideration should be given to the strength and character of our Pacific armaments.

Our naval bases in the Pacific include Puget Sound, our only fleet base on the West Coast; Mare Island, unsuitable for heavy ships; the new naval operating base on San Francisco Bay; the naval operating base at San Diego, which has no repair facilities except for destroyers and submarines; and the great fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which is badly in need of additional drydocks and especially a floating drydock capable of being moved to some other location if needed.

The development of air bases in Alaska, and perhaps a small naval base in some such position as Dutch Harbor, will add to the security of our northern flank. Smaller air bases for the use of patrol planes are in course of development on certain Pacific islands which form a chain of outposts for Hawaii. On the southern flank, we possess—but have not fortified—the best harbor in the South Pacific, at Tutuila in the Samoan islands.

The all-important fact of Pacific strategy is that we can, if we must, deliver an attack against Japan which will be a deadly threat to its security, while Japan cannot do the same to us. While this condition, based on our possession of a superior fleet, continues to exist, war between the two countries appears unlikely.

V. OUR MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS

We have briefly examined the relations of our foreign and military policies, the position of the United States in the post-Munich world, and the strategic considerations which affect our interests and our security. There remains to be determined what the actual size and strength of our armed forces should be.

At present our Regular Army consists of approximately 180,000 officers and men. It is gravely deficient in many items of modern armament and munitionment. It is reinforced by a National Guard whose authorized strength is 205,000. Both the Regular Army and the National Guard are maintained at "peace strength"—that is,

from one-third to one-half of war establishment, to be filled up by recruits on the outbreak of hostilities.

Our navy, under the Naval Expansion Act of 1938 (following the abrogation of the Naval Limitation Treaties), will consist, when the strength fixed by the Act has been attained, of 18 battleships, 45 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 56 submarines, 8 aircraft carriers, and 3,000 naval airplanes. It will require not less than 135,000 men. A considerable number of ships must be constructed before these totals in modern-type ships are attained.

The size and composition of the armed forces, of course, are factors in our broader policies, which may be examined under the heads of the following three possibilities:

(1) *Assuming that our policy is to be merely the static defense of the continental United States against invasion, with perhaps an outpost at the Panama Canal.*

Many laymen who advocate continental defense assume that there is no real danger of European encroachments in Latin America in the predictable future, or that such encroachments outside the Caribbean area would not constitute a serious threat to our security. Military and naval authorities charged with the responsibility for defense of the United States, however, must question both assumptions. It is possible, of course, that Germany will press its expansion toward the East and will not threaten the Western democracies nor interest itself in Latin America. It is also possible that the expansionist programs of Japan and the European axis powers will be checked before we need to become seriously concerned about aggression in the Western Hemisphere. But military strategists cannot safely assume that these developments will occur. If there is any prospect of eventual encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, we must be prepared to face a state of affairs in which air bases and naval bases of powers, now or potentially inimical to us, will be established within striking distance of our own shores. We must also face the possibility that Latin American states, left at the mercy of the expansionist powers, may turn against the United States. Should these things come to pass, we might be compelled to fight under extremely unfavorable circumstances.

If our policy is limited solely to defense of American soil—without regard to encroachments in South America—we must prepare for a defensive war in which American cities could be attacked from the air and in which America soil might be invaded either from West Indian bases or directly across the Mexican border. Preparations for such a struggle would include:

(1) The building up of an air force at least equal to that of Germany and Italy combined, and its maintenance at that level.

(2) The creation of a great citizen army, perhaps with the introduction of compulsory and universal conscription, and the provision of all the weapons and ammunition reserves needed for at least 1,000,000 combat troops.

(3) Preparation for regimentation of industry, labor, transportation and commerce under centralized control—to be partially accomplished in time of peace, and wholly so at the first hint of war.

(4) Building for our navy, in addition to battleships, cruisers and destroyers, a vast fleet of submarines, escort vessels, various types of coastal torpedo craft and mincraft.

(5) The immediate preparation of air-raid defenses in all our coastal cities and all cities within air range of the coast or the Mexican border, with the provision of shelters for the population, continual black-outs and air-raid drills, and the most thorough plans for evacuation of the people, hospitalization of wounded, and decontamination of gassed areas.

If this is the sort of war we propose to fight, we must be prepared to meet its terrible exigencies. If we find this picture unattractive, let us examine another possible policy.

(2) *Assuming that our policy is to be one of cooperation with other powers to resist and check "aggressors" in Europe and in the Far East.*

This envisages, of course, as to Europe, the possible need of supporting Britain and France against the new German Empire backed by Italy. Since, as far as ships are concerned, Britain and France have, and will continue for many years to have, an overwhelming superiority over Germany and Italy, our additional ships can contribute little to the issue. The Anglo-French naval weakness lies in the vulnerability of their bases. We have no bases in European waters, and cannot supply this deficiency. We can furnish

munitions and other goods, provided we can get them into ports which are being constantly attacked from the air; but then, the same consideration applies to supplies from any other overseas source. The decision in such a war will be gained in one of two ways. Either it will be gained at once, as a result of air attacks on such great centers of population as London and Paris, with the purpose of breaking the "civil will" to fight—and this is a result which American aid could not possibly arrive in time to prevent; or it will be gained—the air attack method having failed or, perhaps, not having been attempted because of its doubtful result—by a long and desperate struggle on land, as in the World War.

In a European war the United States, aside from serving as a supply base for all essential war materials, might also contribute troops and air forces. If we are to make that participation effective, we must begin to prepare now to dispatch a great army to Europe, as we did in 1917-1918. We come back, then, to the building up of at least the framework of a great citizen army, and the complete regimentation of all our resources to transport it across the sea and provision it when it gets there. And we must face the possibility that, having done all this, we shall fail to achieve the result at which we aim; for even more than we, the French and British peoples must now, without delay, take upon themselves additional governmental controls over their internal affairs in order to offer successful resistance against controlled production of German airplanes and munitions. Gradually, these states may cease to be democracies in anything but name. Even if we are eventually victorious, the basic fact remains that the affairs of Europe must be settled by the people who live there. We shall have as little to say about the terms of peace as we had in 1919. The result may—probably will—be one hardly worthy of the sacrifices it will demand of us.

Similar considerations, somewhat less formidable in degree, apply to our participation in any armed attempt to check the Japanese advance in Asia. We have already discussed the difficulties attending a war in the Pacific—difficulties which, it is true, would be somewhat ameliorated if British, French and Dutch bases in the Far East were available to us, but which, even so, are very great. If we are not only to blockade Japan, but to send an army to oppose it

on the Asiatic continent, the size of our military preparations must be fully as great as if we are to interfere in European wars.

(3) Assuming that our policy is the defense of the Western Hemisphere, primarily by the control of sea communications, but abandoning any idea of sending armies to Europe or Asia to take part in wars on those continents.

In this case we begin with the basic theory that our security depends on the exclusion from the Western Hemisphere of aggressive powers. They have no bases here now, and our policy will be to see that they acquire none. Hand in hand with this must go the establishment of such bases of our own as shall give complete freedom of action to our fleet in either ocean; the strengthening of our grip on the short line of communications between the two oceans (Panama or Panama-Nicaragua); a sufficient army to garrison these outlying positions and to provide for the security against sudden attack (raids) on the defensive base on which the whole structure depends (the continental United States), as well as such expeditionary forces of limited objective as may be necessary in furthering operations in this hemisphere; and, finally, the maintenance of a high-seas fleet of such strength and quality as shall enable us always to be superior either in the Atlantic or the Pacific to the fleet of any potential enemy. Both army and fleet must, of course, have an adequate air component.

To estimate what increases or changes in our present establishments this policy will require, we must examine the following items in detail:

A. BASES

Atlantic: The main naval bases are sufficient. A northeastern air base is needed. Acquisition of rights for naval and air bases in Newfoundland would be a most valuable addition. Bermuda and the Bahamas are a danger as long as they may fall into hostile hands.

Caribbean: Fortification and repair facilities are needed at Guantanamo. The development of an eastern outpost in the Puerto Rico-Saint Thomas area, with special emphasis on air, is necessary. Acquisition of rights for another outpost in the Trinidad-Barbados area would be an advantage.

Interoceanic Communications: The defenses of Panama should be somewhat increased, especially anti-aircraft and pursuit aviation; and the Nicaraguan Canal ought to be constructed as soon as possible to provide another means of interoceanic transit.

Pacific: The principal needs are new drydocks at Pearl Harbor, development of air bases, and perhaps a small naval base in Alaska. Fortification of Guam is a controversial matter. It would help our navy if we had to fight Japan; but it might precipitate a war with that country.

B. ARMY

Outlying Possessions: Panama is beyond reach from hostile bases; it must be defended above all against surprise, either by a small raiding force coming overland, or by sudden attack from aircraft carriers. A garrison of about 18,000 men, including the air force, is needed. Hawaii's garrison, which must be prepared to resist a full-dress attack, is almost sufficient at present, and needs but a small air-force increase. A total of 22,500 men will be adequate. Small garrisons are needed for Alaska and Puerto Rico—about 4,000 men in all. Total for overseas possessions: 44,500 men.

Harbor Defenses at Home: These have been somewhat neglected. It is essential that our harbors be protected against seizure for use as an enemy base, thus imposing on any attacker the much more difficult problem of landing troops and supplies over an open beach. Our great naval bases, moreover, must be secured against raids if the fleet is to have freedom of action. The regular troops required for a complete system of harbor defense would be 20,000, reinforced by 18,000 of the National Guard.

Anti-Aircraft Defense at Home: Our cities and industrial centers must be protected against raiding airplanes launched from carriers or from some hastily established base. Even if the carriers or the base were eventually wiped out, the damage to our cities and to civilian morale might be considerable if anti-aircraft defense were neglected; and as for security of naval bases, the same considerations apply here as to harbor defense. It is estimated that 16,200 officers and men of the Regular Army, and 32,400 of the National Guard, are needed for a proper system of anti-aircraft defense.

General Headquarters Air Force: This is the concentrated striking element of the air corps in the continental United States. A strength of about 1,000 combat planes will make it heavily superior either to the total ship-borne aircraft of any conceivable hostile naval combination in either ocean, and fully adequate to overwhelm any attempt suddenly to seize and establish a land air base. For reinforcement of a threatened Latin American nation, a slightly larger force might be advisable, although this is a matter requiring careful study. In addition to the General Headquarters air force our army needs from 300 to 400 planes for Hawaii, 200 to 300 for Panama, 400 for training, 200 for transport and cargo purposes, and 200 (perhaps somewhat more) for observation and reconnaissance missions with units of ground troops and fixed defenses. Attack aviation attached to corps and armies is a probable future need. The total of 2,320 first-line army airplanes fixed by the Baker Board does not need any sharp revision upward; 3,000 to 3,200 would be a reasonable maximum, plus a suitable war reserve.

It is wasteful to build more planes than are actually needed at the outset of any conceivable war, because aeronautical science is advancing so rapidly that today's miracle is obsolete tomorrow. Assemblage in time of peace of excess airplanes merely means the gradual acquisition of a great mass of obsolescent material without adding in any way to the efficiency of the force. What is needed is determination of the number actually required for initial operations, an orderly replacement program to keep that number fully modern and ready for immediate action, and behind that the organization of industry to an extent sufficient to enable it to speed up production of the latest types at any given moment of emergency. An air force of 2,320 planes will require 23,000 officers and men at home, and 5,000 in overseas possessions. The allotted number of National Guard observation squadrons (planes included in the above total) will need 2,400 officers and men.

Mobile Ground Forces at Home: If it be conceived as possible that our navy may be defeated, and that we may have to defend our homeland against invasion, this is certainly the worst situation in which we could find ourselves. A mobile army adequate to deal with this sad eventuality would certainly be sufficient for any lesser

responsibility—such as the provision of expeditionary forces for limited objectives, the support of Mexico or Canada against attack, the maintenance of internal order, and the like. But adequacy to deal with invasion does not mean equality in strength with the armies of other powers. It means a sufficient strength to beat off attack by any force that may conceivably be conveyed here in ships. This number, considering available merchant shipping, will not exceed, in one increment, 200,000 combat troops.

Without going too deeply into details of organization, a Regular Army capable of supplying nine infantry and four cavalry divisions with the necessary corps and army troops, and supported by a National Guard organized on the basis of 18 infantry divisions, with corps and army troops, ought, if properly organized and coordinated, to enable us to put into the field an army of 205,000 men within 24 hours, and still have available in reserve the framework of the National Guard divisions as reinforcements. The strength in time of peace for such a force would be 135,000 regulars and 163,000 National Guardsmen. A Regular Army Reserve of specialists some 30,000 strong would be advisable.

Such a force would not only be able quickly and vigorously to deal with any attack on our shores, but the Regular Army component would be capable of affording the fullest support to the fleet in all the various exigencies which might arise from amphibious operations in this hemisphere. This organization would not, however, be capable of indefinite expansion such as might be required for fighting wars in transoceanic theaters.

The total establishment of the Regular Army, under the foregoing responsibilities, would be about 238,000 officers and men; and of the National Guard, about 219,000. This represents an increase in size of about one-third over the present regular establishment and about 25 per cent in cost; it requires only a very small increase in the National Guard.

It will be necessary, in providing for such a plan of continental defense, to see to it that the forces to execute this policy shall be fully equipped, and very highly trained. This includes not only the immediate provision of such weapons as semi-automatic rifles, light machine guns, infantry mortars, anti-aircraft artillery and

fire-control equipment, certain types of field artillery, coast defense guns, anti-tank guns, tanks and armored cars, but the re-establishment of our waning ammunition reserve. From the personnel angle, the most immediate need is better pay and promotion for the enlisted man; our soldier's average pay is now but little more than half that of the average sailor. If we are to get the type of men required by our new, highly mechanized army, and to retain such men in the service, we must make a military career attractive. A nation which depends on a volunteer professional army cannot afford to disregard the quality of the personnel.

C. NAVY

The principal component of a high-seas navy is the battleship. The heavy gun in the heavy armored ship still remains the one wholly reliable weapon under all conditions of sea warfare; the battleship, able to give and take heavy blows, and stay on the field and go on fighting, must, in the foreseeable future, remain the one naval type capable of fighting through to a decision.

The number, size and qualities of our battleships are partly dependent on such physical considerations as available harbors and docks, and the locks of the Panama Canal, but chiefly on the number, size and qualities of the battleships against which, in the unhappy event of war, they may be opposed in action. For a high-seas fleet whose object is the control of sea communications, and which exists for the purpose of making those communications secure from enemy incursion by the very fact of its existence, a measure of superiority over potential enemies sufficient to make such incursion dangerous, if not suicidal, is needed.

When present building programs are completed, Japan will have 14 capital ships in the Pacific. Under the provisions of present law, we shall have at the same time 18 capital ships, plus three very old ones which will only be effective if largely reconstructed. In the Atlantic, Germany and Italy will have 5 (possibly 6) and 8 capital ships, respectively. As against either possible enemy, then, we shall have a sufficient degree of superiority to enable us to exercise command of our vital maritime areas and communications: a superiority which is not wholly represented by numbers, since 4 Jap-

anese, 4 Italian and 2 German ships will be markedly inferior in armament and defensive qualities to any of our 18 battleships.

It has been urged in some quarters that we should build up our fleet to parity with all three of these powers combined. This view is based on two possible contingencies—the destruction of the Panama Canal, and the chance of our being simultaneously threatened in both oceans. As to the first, a more permanent contribution to our security might be made by constructing the Nicaragua Canal, assuring the rapid transfer of the fleet from one ocean to the other. As to the second, there are two points to be remembered: that we can and should have a defensive armament sufficiently formidable, not to win decisively (which is impossible for static defense), but to gain time for the fleet to operate as seems best against the more threatening of the two perils; and that it will be impossible to coordinate the activities of two naval forces of different nationalities, operating in oceans separated by thousands of miles of hostile terrain, as against the force of one determined power occupying a central position.

In addition to battleships, a navy requires other types of ships: cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mincraft, auxiliaries—the details of which, and their employment, there is hardly space to examine here. The number required is determined by the particular situations which may have to be faced: as to cruisers, not only the number needed for fleet duties, but the length and course of the trade routes to be protected, and the enemy trade routes to be attacked; as to submarines, the defensive flotillas required at various points; and so forth.

Naval aviation is an important element of the fleet. It is divided into ship-borne and shore-based aircraft. Ship-borne aircraft include those with a wheeled landing carriage, which are borne in large vessels (aircraft carriers) possessing flight decks; and those fitted to alight on the water, which are usually propelled into the air by means of catapults. When present programs are completed the United States will have eight aircraft carriers with over 700 aircraft—a distinct superiority over any other navy. We will also be superior to any other navy in catapulted aircraft (scouting planes borne in

cruisers, spotting planes borne in battleships). The total needs of the new fleet in aircraft of these various types is about 1,000.

The second classification of naval aircraft is the patrol plane—the large, long-range flying boat, capable of taking off from or alighting on water surfaces only. Its strategical mobility is increased by the use of tenders, which are floating repair-shops and storehouses for the use of a squadron of patrol planes. By the aid of tenders, the patrol planes can accompany the fleet anywhere. When new bases on the Atlantic Coast, in the Caribbean and Alaska are ready, the navy will need about 800 patrol planes; there will be some of these planes stationed in every maritime area where the navy may have to operate, as they have a considerable defensive value even if the fleet is not present.

The maximum plane strength fixed for the navy is 3,000; the 1,200 required in addition to those enumerated are distributed roughly as follows: training, 500; Marine Corps planes, 200; Naval Reserve, 300; Tactical School, 80; miscellaneous duties (special service, naval districts, experimental), 120. This total seems adequate for the needs of the fleet and other activities.

The naval personnel required for the fleet when it reaches full strength will be 135,000, with complements of ships maintained at 85 per cent of war strength (155,000 with full-strength crews). A well-trained Naval Reserve is needed and, as to organized units, should reach a strength of 35,000. The Marine Corps should be raised to its full authorized strength of about 27,000, with a proper reserve.

One weakness of our present naval program is the extreme slowness with which ships are being constructed. The British cruiser *Gloucester* was recently completed twenty-six months after the driving of the first rivet; it takes us a year longer, on the average, to build a vessel of equal size. Obviously, there is much to be done in improving our shipbuilding capacity; for it is essential that, since we are contenting ourselves with a comparatively modest naval program, we turn out the new ships as rapidly as is consistent with efficiency, and keep up an orderly and well-planned flow of replacements to maintain the full strength of the fleet, while gradually acquiring a reserve of over-age vessels which will be invaluable in war.

VI. CONCLUSION

The national strategy of the United States is one forced upon us by circumstances beyond our control: our geographical position, present activities of expansionist powers, the failure of plans for a rule of international law and a community of nations.

It should be obvious that we cannot, alone, bring peace to a world in which such conditions exist, although we may and should always exert our influence in that direction. It should also be obvious that our own security is absolutely bound up with a policy of preventing the encroachment in any part of this hemisphere of the expansionist nations which are on the march in Europe, Asia and Africa.

These truths being admitted—indeed, they are self-evident—it can hardly be questioned that, in following a military policy of defensive purpose, but equipped with offensive instruments ample to command the oceans which are the natural ramparts of the American continents, we are following the path of national security for the preservation of our free institutions of government, the safety of our people from any form of attack, and the economic conditions necessary and desirable for our welfare.

It may, in conclusion, not be without merit to observe that British sea power has for two centuries been a stabilizing force of no mean importance in international affairs. Today, when British sea power is laboring under very grave disabilities, American sea power is rising and possesses, as to the oceans in which our interests are paramount, the qualities of complete freedom of action which once made British sea power so effective. In the difficult years immediately before us, the existence of American sea power, guaranteeing as it will the exclusion of aggression and the spread of totalitarian power from two of the world's great continents, may similarly prove a stabilizing force: not world-wide in its concrete activities, but certainly world-wide in its influence for peace.

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